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Towards an Animal Ethics for the Anthropocene1 
 
Jozef Keulartz  
 
Abstract 
The complex problems of wildlife conservation during the current stage of the Anthropocene 
– the ‘Great Acceleration’ – are forcing us to develop an alternative to the traditional 
(utilitarian und deontological) approaches within animal ethics. I will put forward Martha 
Nussbaum’s capability approach as a promising alternative to these traditional approaches, 
with the proviso that the current version of her list of basic animal capabilities will need to 
undergo some revision. 
 
“A dog has the right to be a dog.” 




Today, the animal world is under increasing pressure, given the magnitude of anthropogenic 
environmental stress, especially from climate change and habitat fragmentation. Climate 
change facilitates the introduction, establishment, and spread of invasive species at the 
expense of native species. It also confronts native species with the alternative to move outside 
their historic ranges or to go extinct - to ‘move it or lose it’ (Minteer & Collins 2010). 
Managed relocation may be required when threatened species are not able to move on their 
own to other regions where conditions are more suitable. Relocated animals will have to go 
through a long process, from capture and captivity to transport and release to novel areas. 
Habitat fragmentation leads to the ongoing conversion of what were originally 
continuous populations to so-called ‘metapopulations’: collections of subpopulations, that are 
spread geographically over patches of habitat. Because these patches are usually small and 
because the movement of the animals between these patches is restricted for lack of 
connectivity, local extinctions of subpopulations are a common event. This situation asks for 
metapopulation management. Central to this type of management is the exchange of animals 
                                                 
1 This chapter was first presented at the Human Development & Capability Association Conference in 
Washington, September 10-13, 2015, in a session with Martha and Rachel Nussbaum, Amy Linch and Jeremy 
Benedik-Keymer. It was published in Bernice Bovenkerk and Jozef Keulartz. 2016. ‘Animal Ethics in the Age of 
Humans’ (pp. 243-264). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
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between in situ populations (in the wild) and ex situ populations (in captivity). On the one 
hand, captive populations can be used for restocking in areas with declining populations or for 
reintroduction in areas where populations have gone extinct; on the other hand, the 
demographic and genetic viability of ex situ populations can be boosted by supplying genetic 
founders from wildlife populations. 
As a result of these global environmental changes, the distinction between in situ and 
ex situ conservation is gradually breaking down. Instead of a stark contrast between the wild 
and the walled, we now encounter a continuum of environments more or less impacted by 
human activity. Animals are becoming increasingly dependent on care in conditions of 
temporary or permanent captivity. In this situation, we need to develop an alternative to the 
existing leading accounts of animal ethics: the utilitarian (animal welfare) approach and the 
deontological (animal rights) approach. The main problem with these traditional approaches is 
that they offer no guidelines at all for a morally sound management of wild animals in 
captivity. 
Here, I will put forward Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a promising 
alternative to the traditional animal welfare and animal rights approaches. According to this 
approach, the welfare of animals must be measured against the possibilities an environment 
offers animals to actually display their basic natural capabilities. If appropriate care is given, 
animals can flourish in less natural and more human environments.  
To answer the question what actually is involved in appropriate care, i.e. care that 
allows animals to employ their natural capabilities, I will make a distinction between three 
types of care: care for the environment (habitat) of animals, species-specific care, and 
individual care. I will argue that the moral adequacy of various human-animal practices 
depends on whether they succeed in achieving a balanced mix of these types of care. I will 
show how the balance will gradually shift if we move across the continuum between wild and 
captive contexts: in protected nature areas the weight is on care for the habitat of animals, in 
zoos the weight is on species-specific care, while performing animals will predominantly 
depend on individual care (Keulartz and Swart 2012).  
But first, I will briefly discuss the pros and cons of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
vis-à-vis utilitarianism and the rights theory. Although I am convinced that Nussbaum’s 
approach offers a favorable alternative to these approaches, I nonetheless feel that there are 
some contradicting treads running through her account. I will therefore sometimes have to 
think ‘with Nussbaum against Nussbaum’. 
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The Pros and Cons of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
 
According to Clare Palmer (2010) the three most important approaches to animal ethics – the 
utilitarian approach, the rights approach, and the capabilities approach, are ‘capacity 
oriented’. All these approaches argue that animals that possess certain keystone capacities, 
such as sentience, self-consciousness, or rationality, are morally considerable and are 
therefore entitled to respectful treatment. Palmer points out that, in the case of utilitarianism 
and the rights theory, this capacity orientation takes the form of a ‘class system’. The 
members of a group of animals with similar keystone capacities deserve equal moral 
consideration, regardless of their species (Palmer 2010, 45-46). For Tom Regan, who is well 
known for his animal rights theory, this class includes all mentally normal adult mammals 
over the age of roughly one year, that can be considered ‘experiencing subjects-of-a-life’, 
while utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer assumes an even broader class of animals that are 
entitled to equal moral consideration, namely all sentient beings with a capacity for suffering.2 
The problem with this view on the classification of animals manifest in utilitarianism 
and rights theories is that it is too general to provide for sufficient guidance in shaping 
morally sound human-animal relationships. Rights theories are even less able to give such 
guidance because they are almost exclusively concerned with negative duties, i.e., duties not 
to act, and to abstain from certain kinds of actions, such as harming, killing, interfering, 
infringing on liberty et cetera. Most work on animal rights are of little or no help in dealing 
with captive animals because it only tells us what we should not to do to animals (Palmer 
2014, 707). 
Although the capabilities approach is also capacity oriented, it differs from the 
utilitarian approach and the rights approach in one very important respect. Nussbaum rejects 
the view, taken by both these approaches, that species membership itself is of no ethical and 
political significance at all. Following James Rachels, Nussbaum calls this view ‘moral 
individualism’.3 The capabilities approach, by contrast, does in fact attach moral significance 
to species membership as such (Nussbaum 2006, 362/3). It is based on a species-specific 
norm of flourishing, that tells us what the appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a 
member of a species has decent opportunities for flourishing, and that commits us to bring 
                                                 
2 “No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally 
with the like suffering - insofar as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being” (Singer 1975, 8). 
3 According to Rachels, “moral individualism is a thesis about the justification of judgments concerning how 
individuals may be treated. The basic idea is that how an individual may be treated is determined, not by 
considering his group memberships, but by considering his own particular characteristics” (Rachels 1990, 173). 
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members of that species up to that norm (idem, 365). What is important for Nussbaum is the 
fulfillment of species-specific capabilities, where each living being flourishes as the sort of 
being it is. 
The main advantage of Nussbaum’s species-specific norm compared to moral 
individualism and the associated class system is that it can provide more and better guidance 
to professionals and practitioners working in various human-animal practices. The capabilities 
approach has more concrete guidelines to offer than utilitarianism and rights theories. And 
whereas rights theories stress negative duties and tell us above all what we should not do to 
animals, the capabilities approach has a strong affirmative character. According to Nussbaum, 
we have a positive duty to support the capabilities of all morally considerable beings, up to 
some minimum threshold level specific to each species. Utilitarian approaches are less 
negative than rights theories, but they are usually also less affirmative than the capabilities 
approach. This also applies to Singer’s preference utilitarianism. By focusing on the passive 
state of preference satisfaction, Nussbaum explains, “utilitarianism shows a deficient regard 
for agency. Contentment is not the only thing that matters in human life; active striving 
matters, too” (idem, 73; 283). The capabilities approach places great emphasis on activity and 
flourishing. “Its basic goal is to address the need for a rich plurality of life activities” (idem, 
346). 
However, the considerable conceptual gains that Nussbaum is able to achieve through 
the introduction of the species-specific norm of flourishing in animal ethics are at least partly 
being undone by the way she compiles a catalogue of innate or ‘basic’ capabilities relevant to 
animal species. On the one hand, Nussbaum’s account of animal capabilities seems to be 
distinctly pluralist. The capabilities approach is attentive to the fact that each species has a 
different form of life, and is capable of recognizing a wide range of types of animal dignity, 
and of the corresponding needs for flourishing (idem, 327). But on the other hand, Nussbaum 
suggests a one-fits-all approach, that has a distinct anthropocentric character as it applies the 
same human yardstick to all animal species.4 Although she fully acknowledges that species-
specific entitlements of animals are based upon their various characteristic forms of life and 
flourishing, she nonetheless wants to use the existing list of human core capabilities “to map 
                                                 
4 In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum argues that the central capabilities “are held to have value in 
themselves, in making the life that includes them fully human” (emphasis added) (2000, 74). 
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out, in a highly tentative and general way, some basic political principles that can guide law 
and public policy in dealing with animals” (idem, 392).5 
 
The Predator Problem 
 
What seems most problematic, when applied to animals, is the Other Species capability, i.e. 
the capability or entitlement to be able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature (Cripps 2010, 8). This capability, Nussbaum suggests, “calls 
for the gradual formation of an interdependent world in which all species will enjoy 
cooperative and mutually supportive relations with one another. Nature is not that way and 
never has been. So it calls, in a very general way, for the gradual supplanting of the natural by 
the just” (2006, 399). This clearly implies that we should stop all predators from hunting and 
eating prey.6 
Like animal ethicists of all colors, Nussbaum is also struggling with the so-called 
‘predator problem’. This problem arises from the need to reconcile two seemingly conflicting 
views. On the one hand, most animal ethicists believe that, if animals truly have a right to life, 
then we ought to protect them from being killed by their predators. But, on the other hand, 
they generally agree that there is a basic presumption against interference with animals in the 
wild (Cowen 2003). 
Peter Singer, for instance, fears that interfering with nature to save animals from 
predation would cause more harm than good.7 However, as a matter of principle, Singer 
believes that “if, in some way, we could be reasonably certain that interfering with wildlife in 
a particular way would, in the long run, greatly reduce the amount of killing and suffering in 
the animal world, it would, I think, be right to interfere” (Singer 1973).8  
Tom Regan is also opposed to interference with nature to protect prey animals. 
Although wild animals can certainly harm one another, Regan argues, they cannot violate one 
                                                 
5 In her review of Steven Wise’s book Rattling the Cage, Nussbaum points to an important difference in the 
ethical evaluation that is involved in preparing capabilities lists: “With the human capabilities, we are evaluating 
ourselves. If we get it wrong, we are the ones who take the consequences. With animals, we are again the ones 
performing the evaluation – and there is great danger that we will get it wrong” (Nussbaum 2001, 1542/3). 
6 This demand calls to mind the utopian conditions after the Second Coming of Christ, where ‘The wolf shall 
dwell with the lamb’ (Wissenburg 2011).  
7 Saving wild animals “on any large scale would have disastrous ecological consequences”, according to his 
fellow-consequentialist Aaron Simmons (2009, 26). 
8 White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy Jeff McMahan (2010) has embraced “the heretical conclusion that we 
have reason to desire the extinction of all carnivorous species”. He is actually in favor of selecting carnivorous 
species for extinction and herbivorous species for survival, and would also support using genetic modification to 
gradually turn carnivorous species into herbivorous ones. 
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another’s rights since, in contrast to human predators, nonhuman predators are not moral 
agents, but only moral patients. “Animals are not moral agents and so can have none of the 
same duties moral agents have, including the duty to respect the rights of other animals” 
(Regan 1983, 357). 
Interestingly enough, in the preface of the second edition of The Case for Animal 
Rights, Regan has put forward an idea that might shed new light on the predation problem. In 
response to Carl Cohen’s critical question, why we should save a human life from predators 
but not an animal’s life when doing so would be equally within our power (Cohen 1997, 95), 
Regan asks us to imagine two cases: one in which a wild animal is threatened by a predator 
and another case in which the predator is threatening a human child. He argues that the 
difference between the two cases is that wild animals possess a certain ‘competence’ and are 
capable of ‘using their natural abilities’ to survive on their own in the wild, whereas human 
children do not. We honor this competence of wild animals by just letting them be, even if 
their lives are threatened by predators (Regan 1983, xxxvi–xxxviii). 
This recourse to the notion of competence with regard to prey animals could open the 
way for a less ambivalent solution to the predator problem than we have seen to date. This 
solution would in fact be perfectly in line with the capabilities approach, that centers on the 
idea that a creature’s well-being is dependent on its opportunities to realize some basic natural 
abilities. But this avenue is blocked as long as we include the Other Species capability, that 
calls for cooperative and mutually supportive relations between species, in the list of central 
capabilities. As Nussbaum has argued, however, this list is “open-ended and humble” and 
“can always be contested and remade” (Nussbaum 2000, 77). It is, therefore, always possible 
for items to be both added to or deleted from the list. In the next section, it will be shown that, 
without a revision of the current version of the list, the capabilities approach runs into some 
substantial trouble when it comes to the management of wilderness areas.  
 
Wilderness Areas and the Care for Habitat 
 
Like most animal ethicists, Nussbaum attaches moral weight to the possibility for animals to 
enjoy sovereignty. She endorses “the idea that species autonomy is part of the good for 
nonhuman animals” (Nussbaum 2006, 375). At first glance, she seems to endorse the view 
that animals can pursue their own flourishing best when left to their own devices, and that we 
have no positive duties to support their welfare, providing them with food, shelter and 
healthcare. Such a ‘benevolent despotism’ of humans over animals might even be perceived 
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as morally repugnant, because part of what it is to flourish for animals “is to settle certain 
very important matters on its own, without human intervention, even of a benevolent sort” 
(idem, 373).  
On closer inspection, however, Nussbaum does not fully accept the view that we have 
no positive duties towards animals in the wild, although she admits that there is “much truth” 
in this view. The reason is that in today’s world it is hardly the case anymore for animals to 
live sovereign and autonomous lives, unaffected by human interference. The environments on 
which animals depend for their survival are being increasingly disturbed or destroyed by 
human activity, and their opportunities for nutrition, shelter, and free movement are in 
constant decline. In this situation, where the possibilities for flourishing are severely limited, 
Nussbaum believes that we should not leave the animals to their fate but should take measures 
to preserve “at least some part of the creature’s original habitat” (idem, 376). 
Since wild animals are currently under increasing pressure from human activity, 
Nussbaum clearly assumes that we have a positive duty of care for their habitat. However, 
living in the early stages of what has been called the planet’s ‘sixth mass extinction’, care for 
the habitat of wild animals cannot rely merely on preservation and protection. The rate and 
magnitude of the anthropogenically driven ‘defaunation’, asks for more offensive and 
interventionist strategies such as recreation, restoration and rewilding (Seddon et al. 2014).  
On both sides of the Atlantic, such strategies are directed at the enlargement of nature 
areas, their connection into coherent and comprehensive networks that allow the exchange of 
individuals between populations, and, last but not least, the (re)introduction of keystone 
species i.e. those species whose impact on their environment is disproportionately large 
relative to their numerical abundance - their return is vital for the restoration of the 
evolutionary and ecological potential that was lost with their removal (Keulartz 2016).  
In North America, most emphasis is on the restoration of large carnivores, because of 
their role in the top-down regulation of ecosystems. Large predators occupy the highest 
trophic level and create impacts that ripple downward along the trophic ladder. They activate 
trophic cascades that are essential to the preservation of biodiversity and the maintenance of 
ecosystem integrity. A famous case in point concerns the reintroduction of the grey wolf in 
Yellowstone National Park in 1995. With the return of the wolf the elk herd, one of the 
world’s largest elk herds, declined 40% in five years. The wolves prevented elk from 
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overbrowsing willow and aspen near rivers and streams, and this gave rise to a substantial 
rebound of the beaver, itself a keystone species that may increase species diversity et cetera.9 
Most animal ethicists will oppose the (re)introduction of predators. Although they are 
not in favor of interfering with nature on behalf of prey animals, they are even less inclined to 
intervene at their expense. Rights theorists, for instance, will argue that by (re)introducing 
predators, humans will become implicated in the killing of prey animals, and because, unlike 
predators, humans are moral agents, we have to do with a rights violation in this case 
(Milburn 2015).10 
Nussbaum is also opposed to the introduction of ‘natural predators’ to control animal 
populations. She prefers any non-violent method of population control to such a violent 
method. The ‘painless predation’ of animals through human hunting, she argues, may be an 
alternative to “other deaths that elks would die, such as starving or being torn apart by 
wolves” (Nussbaum 2006, 394). In an interview with Carla Faralli, Nussbaum puts it this 
way:  
 
“Sometimes people think that they have done a great good thing if they make hunting 
illegal and then, when the deer are reproducing too rapidly and can’t find enough to 
eat, they introduce wolves to tear the deer apart. Actually, I am sure that for the deer 
the hunter’s gun is better than the wolves’ jaws, more sudden and less excruciating” 
(Nussbaum and Faralli 2007, 158) 
 
However, “painless predation” is a misleading term for human hunting. Hunters will in fact 
have to shoot far more prey animals than the numbers that predators would be able to kill. 
This is because prey populations are controlled not only top-down by predation but also 
bottom-up by food availability. Such a bottom-up approach, in which the system is regulated 
by energy moving upward from lower to higher trophic levels, i.e., from plants to herbivores 
to carnivores, is prevalent in Europe. Here, most emphasis is on the restoration of wild large 
herbivores and the introduction of naturalistic grazing, a policy that has been initiated by the 
management of the Oostvaardersplassen, a Dutch polder situated five meters below sea level 
and just half an hour from Amsterdam. Apart from red deer, roe deer, wild boar, and wisent, 
                                                 
9 Recently, some doubts have been raised regarding this success story (Mech 2012). 
10 According to Dale Jamieson, moral evaluation is clearly in order when “predation is in some way affected by 
human agency, either because we have structured the encounter or because the predator is under our direct or 
indirect control” (Jamieson 2008, 186/7). 
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European rewilders also use proxies for large ungulates that went extinct, such as the aurochs 
and the tarpan (the European wild horse) (Klaver et al. 2002).  
As a consequence of the resource-driven bottom-up approach, the population size of 
large herbivores in the Oostvaardersplassen and similar reserves is regulated by limited food 
availability. Consequently, it is not allowed in these reserves to prevent starvation, either by 
proactive culling or by supplementary feeding.11 Only reactive culling to prevent unnecessary 
and prolonged suffering of moribund animals is allowed.  
It is important to realize that the top-down regulation by predation and the bottom-up 
regulation by food availability are forces working together simultaneously (Miller et al. 
2001). The relative influence of these forces varies among ecosystems and depends on a range 
of variables, such as rainfall patterns, soil fertility, and especially the body size and diversity 
of predators and prey in the system, as can be illustrated by the graph below about the 
Serengeti (Hopcraft et al. 2009, 122). Here, large herbivores, such as elephant, tend to be 
regulated by food abundance (dashed blue line), whereas smaller herbivores, such as 
wildebeest, are regulated by food quality (dotted green line). Only the smallest herbivores, 













In short, populations are in varying combinations regulated top-down by predation and 
bottom-up by food availability.12 Because hunters have to substitute for both top-down and 
bottom-up control of prey populations in order to prevent starvation, they generally have to 
                                                 
11 Gary Varner (1995) has termed this type of culling ‘therapeutic hunting’. 
12 In higher latitudes with ecosystems with only one major predator and a few prey species, such as tundra, 
desert, boreal and temperate woodlands, bottom-up control of prey is, in fact, dominant. 
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shoot very large numbers. For instance, in the Veluwe, with 90,000 hectare one of the 
Netherlands’ largest nature reserves, 60 percent of the red deer and 80 percent of the wild 
boar are shot annually. It is estimated that you need 1,400 wolves during 8 months to realize 
such a large-scale cull. 
This type of ‘fauna management’ has a disastrous impact on the natural mechanisms 
that animals in the wild have developed to cope with periodic food shortages. Red deer, for 
instance, are able to resort to a strategy of what has been called ‘hidden hibernation’; their 
heart rate goes down to 30 beats per minute, and their energy use decreases to 13 percent of 
the annual average (Arnold et al. 2004). Another coping mechanism concerns the reduced 
fertility of female animals due to severe weight loss. They skip giving birth for one and 
sometimes even two years, which will offer them the opportunity to regain strength. A 
perverse effect of large-scale culling is the artificial increase of the reproduction rate of the 
animals. Red deer in the Veluwe produce up to three times more calves than in the 
Oostvaardersplassen, where they are only subject to reactive instead of proactive culling. 
So, it is highly questionable whether “for the deer the hunter’s gun is better than the 
wolves’ jaws”, as Nussbaum has claimed in the interview with Carla Faralli - human 
predation seems far from being a worthwhile substitute for natural predation. Abolishing or 
inhibiting natural predation, is problematic, if only because a fairly large number of animals 
are both predator and prey. But, more importantly, it is problematic because it would 
definitely make an end to species sovereignty and autonomy, and have a negative impact on 
the flourishing, not only of predator species but also of prey species. 
Nussbaum points out the danger “of romanticizing nature, or suggesting that things are 
in order as they are, if only we humans should stop interfering” (Nussbaum 2006, 367). But 
she runs the risk of falling into the other extreme, by demonizing nature. Following John 
Stuart Mill in his essay ‘Nature’, she portrays predators as vicious criminals, merciless 
executioners and great monsters, inflicting painful torture and gruesome death on other 
vulnerable and defenseless creatures. This picture is deceptive because the hunter’s gun is 
seldom more sudden and excruciating than the wolves’ jaws; quick kills are rare, and many 
animals suffer prolonged, painful deaths when hunters severely injure but fail to kill them.13 
On the other hand, a prey animal that is being chased by a predator will produce endorphin, a 
chemical that is kin to opiates, and that acts as an analgesic, a natural pain-killer. 
                                                 
13 A British study of deer hunting found that 11 percent of deer killed by hunters died only after being shot two 
or more times and that some wounded deer suffered for more than 15 minutes before dying (Bradshaw and 
Bateson 2000). 
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But, above all, Nussbaum’s picture is a caricature of both predators and prey, who 
have evolved over many millennia in interaction with each other. During this tight 
evolutionary relationship, prey species have developed a stunning array of mechanisms to 
cope with predators for every stage of their struggle: the avoidance of detection by the 
predator (such as camouflage, refuge use, nocturnality), the avoidance of attack once detected 
(mimicking animals with strong defenses, signaling to the predator that pursuit is not 
worthwhile), the avoidance of capture once attacked (fleeing, bluffing strength), and the 
avoidance of consumption once captured (playing death or ‘thanatosis’, sacrificing body parts 
or ‘autotomy’).  
In a certain sense, one can say that predators and prey fit together like puzzle pieces. 
Without predators, prey animal’s possibilities for flourishing will be diminished, because all 
the amazing capabilities they have gained over evolutionary time to cope with predators might 
be rendered meaningless. All in all, we can safely conclude that it is counterproductive to 
extent the Other Species capability to the animal kingdom. Instead of working to ensure that 
all species will enjoy cooperative and mutually supportive relations, we should respect the 
natural capabilities of animals, be they predator or prey, without romanticizing or demonizing 
their agonistic interactions.14 
 
Zoos and Species-Specific Care 
 
Given the global processes mentioned in our introduction, traditional in situ (place-based) 
conservation methods seem no longer sufficient to save threatened species (Sandler 2012). 
The magnitude of anthropogenic environmental stress from bioinvasion, habitat 
fragmentation, nitrogen deposition, biodiversity loss, and, above all, climate change, makes it 
unavoidable to replace the hands-off approach that has guided mainstream species 
conservation until recently by a more proactive and interventionist strategy. However, this 
new strategy has led to manifold conflicts between wildlife conservationists and animal 
protectionists (Minteer & Collins 2013).  
                                                 
14 David Schlosberg has also rejected Nussbaum’s idea that we should protect prey animals from predators. He 
contends that she has a too narrow view of what it means to flourish as a prey animal: “we need to understand 
and accept that part of the flourishing of animals is to be the protein for other life forms… To be food for others 
is the essence of functioning for some beings” (Schlosberg 2007, 151). Elizabeth Cripps has rightly remarked 
that this specific argument is only convincing, so long as it concerns the species as a whole. “It may be part of 
the functioning of the species that it is food for another species; but to say that it is part of the functioning of that 
particular gazelle to be so overlooks precisely the concern for the capacity of individual animal lives to go better 
or worse that Nussbaum wants to recognize” (Cripps 2010, 10). 
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Animal ethicists generally question the intentions of conservationists. For instance, 
Dale Jamieson is convinced that the motivation for reintroduction and rewilding programs 
“centres on the satisfaction of human preferences rather than on concerns about animal 
welfare or the maintenance of ecological values” (Jamieson 2008, 194). He shares the view of 
Marc Bekoff (2000) that these programs are nothing but humans’ attempts to ‘redecorate’ 
nature. Conservationists, for their part, are strongly opposed to animal rights proponents in 
particular. According to Michael Hutchins, “it is time to face up to the fact that animal rights 
and conservation are inherently incompatible and that one cannot be an animal rights 
proponent and a conservationist simultaneously” (Hutchins 2008, 816).  
As Hutchins rightly points out, animal rights proponents have fought vehemently 
against virtually every form of wildlife research or management. They oppose programs to 
control or eliminate destructive invasive species that involve techniques such as hunting and 
trapping or make use of pesticides such as piscicides, chemical substances which are 
poisonous to fish (Keulartz and Van der Weele 2008). They also oppose managed relocation, 
because of the chronic stress that relocated animals will experience at all stages of the 
process, from capture and captivity to transport and release to novel areas. And, last but not 
least, they oppose ex situ conservation through zoos and aquaria.  
As a response to the ongoing decline in effectiveness of in situ conservation and the 
accompanying loss of biodiversity, zoos began to turn their attention to the conservation of 
endangered species and wildlife in the 1970s and 1980s. ‘Captivity for Conservation’ became 
a crucial slogan for the modern zoo. A major milestone in this development was the 
Convention on Biodiversity which was signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
In the wake of the Earth Summit the first World Zoo Conservation Strategy was launched in 
1993. Its conclusion explicitly stated that, at a time when species, habitats and ecosystems 
worldwide are threatened with extinction, modern zoos must commit to the conservation of 
species and wildlife. 
Most animal rights proponents consider infringing an individual’s right to freedom for 
the sake of the preservation of the species as morally wrong. For Regan any type of captivity 
or manipulation of a sentient animal is morally unacceptable, irrespective of the possibly 
beneficial consequences for the protection of rare or endangered species. The rights view’s 
answer to the question whether zoos are morally defensible, “not surprisingly, is No, they are 
not” (Regan 1995, 46). Utilitarian Peter Singer, on the other hand, seems to accept some 
reductions in animal welfare when the survival of entire populations or species is at stake. He 
feels, however, that most zoos today fail to live up to their conservation mission. They tend to 
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confine animals for our amusement in ways that are contrary to their interests. Even if these 
zoos do occasionally preserve an endangered species, “what is the point of preserving animals 
if they are having miserable lives?”15 His fellow-utilitarian Jamieson is even more skeptical 
about zoos than Singer; he considers the benefit of species conservation “not significant 
enough to overcome the presumption against depriving an animal of its liberty” (Jamieson 
1995, 60). 
The problem with the rights approach and the utilitarian approach is that they say little 
or nothing to guide us in the case of animals that depend on care in conditions of temporary or 
permanent captivity. As we have seen, these approaches hold the view that species 
membership in itself is of no moral relevance; they do not recognize significant differences 
within the broad group of animals that belong to the class that deserve equal moral 
consideration because they possess some core capacities, such as sentience or being an 
experiencing subject-of-a-life. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, by contrast, does attach 
moral significance to the species to which a creature belongs. Her species-specific account of 
flourishing commits care takers to support the capabilities of captive animals, and enables us 
to judge whether they have ample and appropriate options and opportunities to perform 
species-specific activities.  
Compared to utilitarians and rights proponents, Nussbaum has a rather positive 
opinion about zoos. With respect to endangered species, she argues that we should not only 
try to preserve at least some part of their original habitat, but that we should also make 
“intelligent and careful” use of zoos. “Many animals will do better in an imaginative and 
well-maintained zoo than in the wild, at least in present conditions of threat and scarcity” 
(Nussbaum 2006, 376). In the interview with Carla Faralli, Nussbaum expresses her belief 
“that zoos have a good role to play, both in educating the public about animals and in 
developing breeding programs. The new type of zoo is a place not for painful captivity but for 
wide-ranging movement, and these zoos are sites of important research” (Nussbaum and 
Faralli 2007, 160). 
There are, however, limitations to the extent to which species-specific activities can be 
carried out in zoos. It may be true that there is a strong tendency toward the ‘naturalization’ of 
zoos, but this process runs up against limits. Zoos cannot include the reproduction of natural  
contingencies. Some forms of predatory behavior, such as chasing and killing prey, cannot 
                                                 
15 http://www.mkhumanists.org.uk/node/73. 
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realistically be simulated in captivity. Likewise, in the absence of predators, some forms of 
prey behavior, such as vigilance, may not be exhibited at appropriate levels in captivity. 
In short, captivity usually deprives wild animals of the necessity and opportunity to 
pursue the tasks of survival, such as finding food and avoiding enemies. Heini Hediger, know 
as the ‘father of zoo biology’, considered this lack of occupation of the captive animal as “one 
of the most urgent problems in the biology of zoological gardens” (Hediger 1950, 158). Quite 
a lot of studies show that animals prefer to work for their food, rather than to be fed ad 
libitum; they will most often voluntarily work for their food, even if the same food is available 
free (Neuringer, 1969; Anderson & Chamove, 1984; Laule and Desmond 1998). Especially 
mammals are unsuited to an existence in which no effort on their part is required to meet their 
basic needs (Kreger et al. 1998). 
A solution to this problem is ‘substitution.’ Animals, particularly mammals, are 
flexible enough to modify their behavior to suit a wide range of situations and to substitute 
one form of action for another depending on the facilities available. In Frontiers of Justice, 
Nussbaum mentions an example of substitution. Modern zoos have to face the problem of 
allowing the capabilities of predatory animals like tigers to be exercised without actually 
harming or killing prey animals. The Bronx Zoo has found an answer to this question—
instead of giving a tiger a tender gazelle to crunch on, it gives the tiger a large ball on a rope, 
whose resistance and weight symbolize the gazelle. “Wherever predatory animals are living 
under direct support and control,” Nussbaum concludes, “these solutions seem the most 
ethically sound” (Nussbaum 2006, 370).16 
The introduction of such novel objects - ‘toys and treats’ – is just one option for 
providing ‘environmental enrichment,’ by which the expression and development of species-
specific behaviors and abilities can be achieved, usually to the benefit of animal welfare. 
Feeding enrichment is also an important option. Anna Claxton (2011) mentions three 
strategies in feeding enrichment: increasing the number of daily feeding sessions; making the 
feeding schedule less predictable; and making the food less easy to obtain, either by hiding it 
or by adding a level of complexity to the food manipulation process, such as providing live 
prey or full carcass meals (see also Ross 2002).  
Another major enrichment strategy concerns the improvement of enclosure design. 
Most zoos suffer from a severe lack of space; the space for all the zoo animals in the world 
could easily fit within New York’s 212.7 km2 borough of Brooklyn (Conway 2011, 4). To 
                                                 
16 Nussbaum notes with some regret that “we do not have the option of giving the tiger in the wild a nice ball on 
a string to play with” (Nussbaum 2006, 379).  
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address this problem, zoos have a number of options. They can reduce the number of species 
they maintain that are not threatened and specialize in species that are. They can also replace 
big charismatic mammals with smaller species, particularly amphibians, invertebrates and 
some species of fish, which occupy less space, are relatively inexpensive to keep, have a high 
birth rate and are easy to reintroduce (Keulartz 2015; in this volume). 
A recent and also very promising strategy to tackle the problem of limited space 
concerns the creation of walkways between enclosures that allow animals greater freedom of 
movement. Building a network of trails, in particular top tree trails, gives animals the 
opportunity to rotate between various interconnected display and off-display areas. Animals 
may spend mornings in one area and afternoons in another. The concept of such animal 
rotation displays is based on Hediger’s theory of territory, a wild animal’s living space made 
up of a variety of special areas, such as dens, basking sites, and foraging areas, interconnected 
by regular pathways (Coe 2004). 
Still other methods of environmental enrichment for captive animals include sensory 
stimulation in the form of auditory, olfactory and visual cues, and social enrichment, which 
provides animals the opportunity to interact with other animals, either conspecifics (same 
species) or contraspecifics (other species). A good example of the latter are mixed-species 
exhibits. They provide an interactive and dynamic experience for the animals, visitors and zoo 
staff. In mixed-species enclosures activity levels are typically higher, with more play 
behaviors, and this generally has a positive effect on both the physical and the mental health 
of the animals (Veasey and Hammer 2010, 151). Moreover, interspecific interactions can 
contribute to successful reintroductions. Animals from mixed-species exhibits are more likely 
to cope with the complexity of their natural habitat after introduction. Even ‘negative’ 
interspecific interactions, e.g. controlled nonlethal exposure to predators, may be beneficial in 
survival postrelease (idem, 153). 
Finally, a special case of environmental enrichment concerns what Hediger has called 
‘occupational therapy’. “The captive animal,” Hediger suggested, “must be given a new 
interest in life, an adequate substitute for the chief occupation of freedom… This substitute 
can take the form of biologically suitable training and assumes the importance of occupational 
therapy” (Hediger 1950, 158).  
Animal training is an important component of animal enrichment programs as it 
facilitates exercise and mental stimulation. Training can also provide the animals with the 
motivation, skill, and confidence they need to use the enrichment devices they have been 
offered in the most successful way. Through training by positive reinforcement, animals can 
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be taught to participate in daily health and husbandry care, without sedation or restraint. By 
voluntarily participating in their treatment during dental work, blood draws, urine collection, 
stethoscope examinations, artificial inseminations et cetera, they will obtain benefits in the 
form of preventive and curative health care. Also, the stress that is usually related to these 
procedures can be significantly reduced by teaching animals to voluntarily participate in their 
daily health and husbandry care. 
Furthermore, training is also relevant for the relationship between the animal and its 
care giver, which is of critical importance for many species in captivity. The well-being of 
zoo animals is greatly enhanced if there is a trusting, amiable relationship with their keepers. 
The trust between animals and keepers can be reinforced by training animals to follow 
commands and teaching them simple routines using positive reinforcement. “Building a 
trusting and caring relationship, teaching the different procedures on cue and establishing 
strong reinforcement histories with our animals, enabling them to behave in a secure manner 
and provide the ability to anticipate what is happening to them, whether good or bad” (Brando 
2010, 783). 
Although training undoubtedly improves the welfare of animals and also makes 
routine examination and veterinary treatment less stressful, zoos are reluctant to use training, 
as Trevor Poole has noticed, “because they fear to be accused of not being serious or of 
turning into circuses” (Poole 1998, 91). For years animal training was motivated by the 
entertainment industry and has been associated only with animal shows. 
 
Performing Animals and Individual Care 
 
The circus has witnessed a transition from the use of punishment and other coercive methods 
to the use of methods that focus on positive reinforcement, which provides animals greater 
choices and greater control over their lives. The circus has also increasingly moved away 
from showing costumed animals displaying human-like characters toward showcasing them 
performing more naturalistic behaviors. Both developments are captured in the Code of 
Conduct for Animals by the European Circus Association (ESA 2007): “All animal training 
must be based on operant conditioning and the use of positive reinforcement and repetition of 
desired behaviors. Training should showcase individual animals’ natural behaviors and 
athletics.” These developments didn’t prevent campaigns against the use of wild animals in 
circus acts to be successful in achieving bans almost worldwide. Nussbaum (2006, 392) seems 
to be quite positive about this development, although her capability approach does not 
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preclude acceptance and even appreciation of animal performance training. Again, we need to 
think ‘with Nussbaum against Nussbaum.’ 
When we turn to performing animals, the balance of care will shift once more, from 
species-specific care to individual care. Nussbaum argues that both types of care are 
important for animals to flourish. Her perspective is individualistic in making the living 
creature - not the group or species - the basic subject of justice, but at the same time she 
rejects the view that all moral relevance lies in the capacities of the individual. The 
capabilities approach should give a species-specific account of basic capabilities without 
losing sight of the capacities and personality of the individual animal. A respectful 
consideration of the species norm of flourishing should go hand in hand with a respectful 
attention to the capacities of the individual. 
To gain insight in the prospects and problems of individual care for performing 
animals, including circus animals, it is useful to have a look at the work of two philosophers 
who have been theoretically and practically engaged in animal training: Donna Haraway and 
Vicky Hearne (Keulartz and Swart 2012). 
Donna Haraway, a path-breaking feminist philosopher, best known for her 1991 essay 
The Cyborg Manifesto, has more recently been focusing her attention on human-animal 
relationships. In 2003, she published The Companion Species Manifesto, and in 2008 her 
book When Species Meet came out. What holds this book together is Haraway’s relationship 
with her Australian shepherd Cayenne, with which she does agility work. 
Haraway is less interested in Jeremy Bentham’s famous question “Can animals 
suffer?” than in the questions: “Can animals play? Or work?” (Haraway 2008, 22)17 To better 
understand and nurture our responsibilities for animals Haraway feels that Karl Marx’s 
category of labor is more helpful than the Enlightenment’s category of rights. According to 
Haraway, training, working with animals, does not imply submission and oppression; quite 
the contrary, it requires two-way interaction. Training relies on teamwork; trainer and trainee 
have to listen to one another if an act or exercise is going to succeed. Here, Haraway refers to 
the notion of ‘isopraxis’ used by the French ethologist Jean-Claude Barrey to describe the 
interaction between horse and rider, where the questions “Who influences and who is 
influenced?” can receive no clear answer (idem, 229). 
Haraway is influenced by the work of Vicky Hearne, an animal trainer, philosopher, 
and poet, who died in 2001 (see Haraway 2003, 48-54). Hearne, who also put much emphasis 
                                                 
17 Remember that Play is one of the central capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. 
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on mutuality and reciprocity in the working relationships between humans and animals, 
fiercely opposed the animal rights discourse. In an essay – ‘What’s Wrong with Animal 
Rights’ – that was included in the 1992 edition of The Best American Essays Series, edited by 
Susan Sontag, Hearne expressed her fear that animal rights activists, by branding training of 
any sort as torture, could deprive animals of the satisfaction they experience from work. She 
disagrees with the definition of ‘happiness’ as synonym for ‘pleasure’ and as antonym for 
‘suffering.’ To better understand ‘animal happiness’ we should trade in Bentham for Aristotle, 
who considered happiness as activity in accordance with the highest excellence. Happiness is 
about a sense of personal achievement, like the satisfaction felt by a good woodcarver or a 
dancer or a poet or an accomplished dressage horse. “This happiness, like the artist’s, must 
come from something within the animal, something trainers call talent, and so cannot be 
imposed on the animal” (Hearne 1994, 204). 
Because Donna Haraway and Vicky Hearne primarily draw on experiences gained 
from training dogs and horses respectively, one might get the wrong impression that their 
work is only relevant with regard to domestic animals, not wild animals. However, Haraway 
explicitly challenges the domestic-wild dichotomy, while Hearne has written extensively and 
with admiration about trainers who work with wild animals. An example is the essay 
‘Wittgenstein’s Lion’ about Hubert Wells, well-known for his work with lions for Hollywood 
movies such as ‘Out of Africa’. Another example is her essay ‘Can an Ape Tell a Joke’ about 
the acts of Bobby Berosini with his five Orangutans, an essay that was also included in the 
1994 edition of The Best American Essays Series.  
Hearne was only too well aware that wild animals were under increasing pressure due 
to ongoing habitat fragmentation and destruction. As a consequence, she writes,  
 
“It looks as though we no longer have the option of simply leaving nature alone, looks 
as though something more radical is necessary in the way of a transformed 
relationship with nature than has yet been suggested. Wild-animal training is certainly 
not a solution to all problems, but the knowledge trainers have may contain clues to 
imaginative and enlightened ways to take up the burden of responsibility towards 
animals” (idem, 192). 
 
From the work of Haraway and Hearne, it can be concluded that responsibility for animals in 
working relations should be considered - to use Haraway’s phrase - as ‘response-ability’ 
(2008, 88), the ability to listen to animals and to meet their needs. Following Viciane Despret 
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(2004), Haraway argues that whether a specific setting is morally acceptable or culpable 
depends on the animal’s possibilities of ‘resistance’ when its wishes fall on deaf ears and it is 
forced to compliance and docility. Marine-mammal veterinarian James McBain has 
formulated this requirement as follows: “We should work with animals as if gates and doors 
weren’t there; as if they could leave any moment they wanted. If they then decide to stay and 
work with you, then you can say you have a good bond and trust and is the animal truly 
interested in being with you” (cited in Brando 2010, 783; cf. Brando 2012, 394). 
On the one hand, it is obvious that the possibilities for care for the environment in a 
performance setting are almost absent, while the possibilities for species-specific care are 
fairly limited. The possibilities for individual care and attention, on the other hand, seem 
relatively large. One should of course, on a case-by-case basis, try to assess whether the 
happiness that results from the labor of training and performance can compensate for the lack 
of care for the environment and the deficit of species-specific care. 
Now, Nussbaum seems to be somewhat ambivalent with respect to animal training. On 
the one hand she is convinced that most domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, have 
entitlements to ‘suitable education’, Nussbaum’s name for training. These animals profit from 
some training and discipline. Indeed, if they are given the appropriate training they “are 
capable of fine feats of athletic excellence” (Nussbaum 2006, 377). Nussbaum also seems to 
suggest that zoo animals are entitled to some forms of training, since she laments that “one of 
the greatest defects of most zoos has been their boringness, which constitutes a cruel assault 
on animals’ opportunities for flourishing” (idem, 397). But, on the other hand, Nussbaum 
seems to be opposed to the use of wild animals in circus acts, as we have seen previously. 
However, compared to a zoo environment, a circus environment is likely to address 
the cognitive abilities of the animals more often, as it may provide more and varied stimuli. 
That is at least the opinion of Hans Hopster and Ingrid de Jong, the authors of a recent report, 
commissioned by the Dutch government, that describes the scientific literature and expert 
views concerning the keeping, training and performance of sea lions in traveling circuses and 
the consequences for their health and welfare. One of their findings is that according to most 
experts, sea lion behavior strongly suggests that they are happy to be trained and like to 
perform. “They express anticipation to performances by looking for the trainer, by waiting at 
the gate of their accommodation, by willingly entering performance areas and taking their 
positions (station), by pre-empting clues for behaviors, by walking back and forth, swaying, 
stretching out to see where the trainers are, and other expressions of eagerness to participate” 
(Hopster and De Groot 2014, 20). Another finding is that there is a lot of trust between sea 
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lions and their trainers, due to the fact that circus trainers literally live with their animals 24 
hours a day. “It is therefore highly likely that circus sea lions, besides being economically 
very valuable for their owners, also have emotional value to them. Within the constraints of 
the circus, sea lions probably get therefore the best possible care” (ibid.). 
It is of course questionable whether the benefits of training and performance for sea 
lions in traveling circuses outweigh the major hazards to their welfare – the Dutch report 
mentions pool dimensions, space, social conditions, food and water quality, and exposure to 
UV light as the major potential causes of poor welfare. 
Nussbaum might add that the sea lions’ expressions of happiness do not necessarily 
reflect the truth about their well-being. Their preferences for training and performance could 
be adaptive preferences – Nussbaum also speaks of ‘submissive’ or ‘fear-induced’ preferences 
(Nussbaum 2006, 344).18 Adaptive preferences are formed under bad or unjust background 
conditions, as a generally unconscious and unintended adaptation to our actual situation which 
compares unfavourable with the desired situation.19 People under circumstances of poverty, 
deprivation and injustice can adjust their wants to their possibilities and thus still consider 
themselves to be happy and well-off - the Happy Slave being the paradigmatic example of this 
predicament. 
We have, however, reason to be very cautious with applying the concept of adaptive 
preferences to animals. As Nussbaum herself has indicated, “the interpretation of animals’ 
preferences is fraught with obscurity and difficulty” (idem, 343). Recall Nussbaum’s example 
of the tiger in a zoo that appears satisfied when given a large ball on a rope whose resistance 
and weight symbolize the gazelle. The question is of course whether the tiger is really 
satisfied or whether he has merely adapted his preferences to his options. The latter is the case 
if one agrees with Daniel Crescenzo that killing is part of exercising predatory instinct, and 
that the opportunity to fully exercise predatory instinct is a central capacity in its own right for 
predators and may thus be essential for predator flourishing. According to Crescenzo, “A 
large ball on a rope allows for some exercise of the predatory instinct, but the simulation of 
killing it provides is quite limited” (Crescenzo 2012, 195).  
It is obviously very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the adaptive from the 
non-adaptive preferences of animals. More importantly, adapting one’s preferences to ones 
                                                 
18 As Rosa Terlazzo has rightly remarked, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach “is centrally motivated by the 
problem of adaptive preferences” (Terlazzo 2014, 185). 
19 The term ‘adaptive preference’ was introduced by Jon Elster in his book Sour Grapes from 1983. Elster refers 
to La Fontaine’s (originally Aesop’s) fable of the Fox and the Grapes to explain what he means by preference 
adaptation. In the fable, after realizing that it cannot reach some grapes hanging high on the vine, a hungry fox 
turns away from them and declares them too sour for its tastes. 
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situation can be a wise thing to do, a sign of resilience, i.e. the capacity to withstand shocks 
and surprises, and to maintain or regain psychological well-being in the face of changing and 
challenging circumstances. It seems at least a wise thing to do for wild animals that have 
become increasingly dependent on care in conditions of temporary or permanent captivity, as 
a result of the ongoing blurring of boundaries between in situ and ex situ conservation, and 




Martha Nussbaum certainly deserves credit for breaking with the currently still dominant 
doctrine of ‘moral individualism’ that holds that species membership itself is of no ethical and 
political significance. With the introduction of the species-specific norm of flourishing in the 
animal ethics debate, Nussbaum has opened up promising avenues towards a morally sound 
guidance for professionals and practitioners working with wild animals in captivity, which is 
of imminent importance in the emerging Anthropocene era, the age of human dominion of the 
Earth, at least if we really want to stop or even reverse the defaunation process. However, to 
make this avenue accessible and passable, we should abandon Nussbaum’s one-fits-all 
approach, which applies the same human yardstick to all animal species, and develop a truly 
species-specific account of central animal capabilities.  
The task of determining which capabilities members of an animal species typically 
have is a complex one and calls for a broadening of Nussbaum’s methodological perspective. 
Her conception of flourishing is thoroughly evaluative and ethical (Nussbaum 2006, 366). 
Nussbaum insists that we cannot simply “read off” species norms directly from observation of 
animals’ characteristic ways of life (idem, 347 and 497). She suggests that we can come to 
recognize what animal flourishing entails through an Aristotelian-style “considered judgment” 
in conjunction with ‘sympathetic imagination’ (idem, 352-53). But, in order to create a really 
species-specific account of core capabilities, we cannot be content with moral evaluations 
only but we will have to combine them with empirical investigations from a wide range of 
animal sciences such as ethology, wildlife ecology, zoo biology, and conservation biology.  
Some of Nussbaum’s statements seem to support such a plea for an empirically informed 
approach to the evaluation of what is essential to the flourishing of different species.20  
                                                 
20 “It seems best for humans not to engage in too much second-guessing of animal capabilities, but try to observe 
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